

## **Annotated Bibliography: Locally-led Peace**

This annotated bibliography provides an overview of literature on the topic of locally-led peace. Sources are listed in chronological order with a summary of the main points or findings.

- ❖ *The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World.* Autesserre, S. (2021).
- ❖ *Reintegration and forgiveness to ex-combatants in Colombia,* Development Studies Research. Orejuela, L. M. & Restrepo-Plaza, L. (2021).
- ❖ *The Interaction between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors: Partners for Peace.* Hellmüller, S. (2018).
- ❖ *Reintegrating Syrian Militants: Mechanisms, Actors and Shortfalls.* Haid, Haid (2018).
- ❖ *Violent Non-State Actors in Africa: Terrorists, Rebels and Warlords- Selected Chapters.* Varin, C.; Abubakar, D. (2017).
- ❖ *Rebel Integration in Conflict Settlements: Past Lessons and the Prospects of MILF Reintegration.* Estrera, A & Lai, J. (2017).
- ❖ *Trusting Former Rebels: An Experimental Approach to Understanding Reintegration after Civil War.* Bauer, M.; Fiala, N. and Lively, I. (2018).
- ❖ *A Comparative Study of Ex-Combatant Reintegration in the African Great Lakes Region: Trajectories, Processes, and Paradoxes.* Rhea, Randolph Wallace. (2014).
- ❖ *Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi.* Gilligan, M. J.; Mvukiyehe, E. N. & Samii, C. (2013).
- ❖ *Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War: Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri,*

Democratic Republic of Congo. Lamb, G.; Alusala, N.; Mthembu-Salter, G.; Gasana, J.. (2012).

- ❖ *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism.* Bob, C. (2005).
- ❖ *Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies.* Nilsson, A. (2005).
- ❖ *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures.* Lederach, J. P. (1996).

**Autesserre, S. (2021). *The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World.* Oxford University Press**

In 'Frontlines of Peace,' Séverine Autesserre examines the well-intentioned but flawed international peace industry. She focuses on the importance of a bottom up approach, in which a peaceworker or aid worker interacts with the local population and intended beneficiaries directly, instead of a top down approach. She emphasizes that peace building can be done by ordinary people and should involve everybody in the community. Autesserre also states that peace efforts should be implemented even while there is ongoing conflict, because it may help to control the violence. Dialogue should also be ongoing, but is not enough on its own and should be followed by action. She continuously emphasizes that it does not and should not cost millions of dollars to implement peace projects, and that a low budget can be enough. A significant criticism is that peace workers do not stay long enough or immerse themselves enough in the local context to be fully effective. Autesserre also describes the problem of insiders in a peace process or conflict setting being frequently placed beneath outsiders, who tend to not have as much local knowledge. However, the author criticizes the 'African solutions for Africa' and the 'Asian solutions for Asia' movements because, although people may come from the same continent or even country, they may be very different from the people who need solutions. Therefore the author argues that the people who have to deal with the consequences should be the ones to make the decisions. Autesserre also covers the issues of having limited time to implement peace work, as peace processes or conferences can last years. The author did note that at conferences, some locals pushed back on 'NGOs and outsiders leaving a setting to insiders only',

noting outsiders can bring different experiences. Autesserre argues that one of the best ways an NGO can be useful, is to link international organizations with locals and national elites and political parties as liaisons. It is useful for locals to have NGOs involved, because they get to talk to people inside their own setting that may not be willing to consider meeting the locals for a discussion or conference.

**Orejuela, L. M. & Restrepo-Plaza, L. (2021) *Reintegration and forgiveness to ex-combatants in Colombia, Development Studies Research. Development Studies Research Journal***

In this article 'Reintegration and forgiveness to ex-combatants in Colombia,' Luis Murillo Orejuela and Lina Restrepo-Plaza provided recommendations for a successful demobilization. The aftermath of over fifty years of uninterrupted conflict has not only led to underdevelopment and casualties, but also the loss of social ties, the mistrust, and the difficulties to build a society in which victims have to live with those who once were their perpetrators. These difficulties are frequently linked to a strong negative affect, prejudice, and skepticism towards forgiveness and reintegration. This paper uses the 2016-Americas Barometer database to provide empirical evidence of how Colombians' attitudes towards the FARC-EP shape the probability of believing in forgiveness and supporting the reintegration process. The study found that for demobilization to be successful a society needs (i) to reduce the perception of danger when surrounded by former rebels, (ii) to enhance perceptions of friendliness and hard-working on behalf of the ex-combatants, and (iii) to be more educated and allow the victims to speak up.

**Hellmüller, S. (2018). *The Interaction between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors: Partners for Peace. Palgrave Macmillan***

In 'The Interaction between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors,' Sara Hellmüller gives a detailed account on how local and international peacebuilders can partner for greater success on the ground. She describes local DRC-based peace builders' perceptions of the conflict were empirically based and influenced by local experiences of peace making. Meanwhile the international peacebuilding actors' perceptions were conceptually based and further strengthened by their interaction with national elite actors. Local peacebuilding actors programs consequently focused on social cohesion consisting of two aspects of reconciliation between ethnic groups and resolution of land conflicts. International peacebuilding

actors priorities were on state building, involving the promotion of the state monopoly in the legitimate use of force and its legal rational authority, which manifested mainly in the implementation of DDR programs and elections. Hellmüller argues that there was a need to relevantly compliment, rather than crowd out or duplicate, local peacebuilding programs of social cohesion at the national level and to make international peace building programs of state building more relevant at the local level. Partnerships between local and international peacebuilding actors could've helped bridge this gap. Specifically in the case of Ituri, the author recommends that international peacebuilding actors can support local peacebuilding actors work where they have clear comparative advantages and facilitate their access to government structures to promote the sustainability of local peacebuilding programs and the accountability of the state. At the same time, local peacebuilding actors can help international peacebuilding actors become aware of local perceptions and priorities and act as intermediaries between them and local chiefs. These recommendations can be very insightful for NGO workers in conflict settings, such as the DRC.

**Haid, Haid (2018). *Reintegrating Syrian Militants: Mechanisms, Actors and Shortfalls*. Carnegie Middle East Center Publications**

In 'Reintegrating Syrian Militants,' Haid Haid argues that rebel reintegration into the national regime forces needs to occur as part of an integrated national rehabilitation program. Haid states that in the place of a nationwide negotiated peace agreement, there has been a series of half-hearted reconciliations imposed by the regime after besieging and battering rebel strongholds into submission. Reintegrating irregulars, be they pro-regime militias or former rebels, into the regime forces has taken place unsystematically, instead of being a part of an integrated national rehabilitation program. In neither case have mechanisms been set up to help former fighters adjust to civilian life. Haid mentions that the majority of former Syrian Militia members who were employed into the regime's military forces were eventually sent to the front lines to fight their former comrades-in-arms, while fewer were integrated into local police departments. Haid proposes the integrated national rehabilitation program as a solution.

**Varin, C.; Abubakar, D. (2017). *Violent Non-State Actors in Africa: Terrorists, Rebels and Warlords*. Palgrave Macmillan**

In 'Violent Non-State Actors in Africa,' edited by Caroline Varin and Dauda Abubakar, eleven different terrorists, rebels, and warlords in different states across the African continent are discussed. The editors note that most of the groups fight mainly for access and material gain, rather than for self-defense and self-preservation as they tend to claim. Three chapters are related to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These chapters were chapter five: the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); chapter six: the Seleka and anti-Balaka rebel movements; and finally, chapter nine: the Lord's Resistance Army.

Chapter five on 'Islamist' Rebels in DRC by Jesper Cullen discusses the ADF, which was founded in Uganda and eventually made its way to the DRC. Initially, the ADF was founded to overtake the Uganda government, but was pushed by the Uganda military into the DRC. At present, the ADF is mainly located in the Beni territory in Eastern DRC, at the border of Uganda. Cullen argues that the group is no longer engaged in the original fight against the state, but is rather a violent 'mafia' like business enterprise that prioritizes commercial activity, such as smuggling of goods across the border to Uganda. He further argues that the ADF is not a credible threat to national security and instead its threat is limited to the Beni territory. The other argument in this chapter was that it was not the Islamist extremist militant group. Cullen states that Uganda's promotion of ADF being a violent Islamic extremist group is most likely done in order to continue receiving the security aid that the US provides for this threat.

Chapter nine by Jo-Ansie van Wyk focuses on Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). At its apogee, it had operated in not only the DRC, but also in Sudan, Uganda, and the Central African Republic (CAR). At one point, Kony, who is also described as a warlord, had about 100,000 fighters engaged in the LRA. Wyk describes him as a warlord, a criminal psychopath, and religious fundamentalist and describes his leadership being in the form of a cult leader over a warlord organization. He is synonymous with the LRA, because he was the only leader of the organization since its inception. Kony's aim as a radical Acholi messianic and liberation fighter was to create a theocracy through a holy war that was going to be based on the Biblical Ten Commandments in Exodus 20. Wyk describes the nature, durability, adaptability, and the evolution of Joseph Kony as a warlord and violent non-state actor in Africa. She goes further and refers to him as a fearlord due to the immense physical and psychological fear that he systematically instills in the areas that he attacks. His legacy of mass child abductions were known world-wide and led to the international manhunt of him and the efforts to destroy the LRA. The US

offered five million dollars as a reward for information that would lead to his capture and Uganda, South Sudan, DRC, and CAR cooperated on an initiative to capture him. The notorious rebel movement and Kony still operate in the territories between DRC, CAR, Uganda, and South Sudan.

Chapter six by Wendy Isaac-Martin discusses the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka rebel movements in the Central African Republic. Isaac-Martin argues that religion and ethnicity are not the primary motivators of violence, but rather it is two other reasons: a result of broken alliances between various groups, including the army, bandits, and militias; and due to political elites manipulating identities in their pursuit of state power. Many of the attacks were attempts to deprive the opponents of recruits, resources, and political support.

**Estrera, A & Lai, J. (2017). *Rebel Integration in Conflict Settlements: Past Lessons and the Prospects of MILF Reintegration*. Naval Postgraduate School Thesis**

In 'Rebel Integration in Conflict Settlements,' Estrera and Lai examine the dynamics and nuances in the peace agreement and rebel reintegration programs between the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The article includes case studies of the civil war settlements of Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone to analyze the policy direction of current rebel reintegration programs. The authors find that an important part of peace agreements is the reintegration process as it is a form of power-sharing. For conflict settlements that have done this successfully, they have followed three methods: integrating the rebels as troopers/soldiers in the national military, setting rebel leaders in the military hierarchy, and allowing units to be created by rebels using their own people. For the reintegration of MILF rebels, they were allowed to create their own police force comprised of their own people. This is different from the other specific cases looked at in this study. Other examples have used this police force reintegration method with added police reform successfully like Ireland and South Africa. It is noted that it will entail more comprehensive planning and detailing to be successful. For example, the GRP maintains a strong national military to stop possible abuses from the separate police forces. Another key variable is the international community as sponsors of the peace settlements. The GRP-MILF agreement utilizes the international community in all aspects of the agreement. The success of the agreement will be increased if the GRP and MILF agree to entrust foreign and local organizations to help implement the rebel

reintegration process. The three concluding points are that rebel reintegration is a necessary form of power-sharing in civil war peace agreements; the international community plays an important role in the reintegration process program in inception, and reception; and the reintegration plan must be simple and implemented immediately.

**Bauer, M.; Fiala, N. and Lively, I. (2018). *Trusting Former Rebels: An Experimental Approach to Understanding Reintegration after Civil War*. *The Economic Journal***

In 'Trusting Former Rebels,' Bauer, Fiala, and Lively discuss former rebels and community trust and trustworthiness. The authors state that the stability of many post-conflict societies rests on the successful rebel reintegration. They examined the social capital of former soldiers in Uganda, where the LRA abducted thousands of youth during conflict. They used a set of interlocked experiments to study behavior of ex-soldiers jointly with the behavior of receiving communities towards this group. Consistent with theories that highlight the importance of cooperation during war, they found that individual cooperativeness robustly increases with the length of time a person was with the LRA, especially among those who were abducted during early age. Furthermore, parents of former-soldiers are aware of the behavioral difference: they trust ex-soldiers more because they expect them to be more trustworthy. Last, we find no evidence of preference-based discrimination, suggesting that anger is attenuated when communities do not attribute responsibility for committed violence to returning soldiers. Together, the results reveal that the impact of child soldiering on social capital, in contrast to human capital, is not necessarily detrimental and, speculatively, may facilitate reintegration.

**Rhea, R. W. (2014). *A Comparative Study of Ex-Combatant Reintegration in the African Great Lakes Region: Trajectories, Processes, and Paradoxes*. *World Bank Group***

In 'A Comparative Study of Ex-Combatant Reintegration in the African Great Lakes Region,' Rhea Randolph Wallace analyzes the reintegration process that ex-combatants go through going from soldiers to civilians across the Great Lakes Region. The study uses a comparative approach that compiles data from 2010-2012 from nearly 10,000 ex-combatants and community members across the Great Lakes Region. The data shows an overall positive trajectory of reintegration over time even though many ex-combatants face structural, political, and economic

barriers. It is noted, ex-combatants have greater success rooting themselves in the community if it is on a positive trajectory of improved stability. Young combatants aged 18-30 lag in the reintegration process compared to older combatants due to their time lost in establishing social and economic connections. Another limiting factor for ex-combatants is gender, female combatants and community members tend to have a negative trajectory, not due to their personal efforts but already existing marginalization against women. The societal shift toward peace that has been

the catalyst for the reintegration process has diminished in the DRC, making the rooting process for ex-combatants harder. The community members and ex-combatants both struggle with the same barrier of lack of opportunities in all GLR countries. Women community members and ex-combatants struggle due to societal disadvantages, such as lack of education and access to capital. All of these factors and disadvantages are exaggerated in the DRC due to the weakest levels of social capital.

**Gilligan, M. J.; Mvukiyehe, E. N. & Samii, C. (2013). *Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution***

In 'Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life' Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii discuss rebel integration in Burundi. Considerable resources are devoted to ex-combatant reintegration programs in current peace processes, but evidence on their effectiveness remains thin. The authors used original survey data to study an ex-combatant reintegration program implemented after Burundi's 1993-2004 civil war. Previous quantitative studies have found reintegration programs to be ineffective, but only ex-combatants who self-selected into programs were studied. They avoid such selection problems with a quasi-experimental design exploiting an exogenous bureaucratic failure. The authors found that the program resulted in a 20 to 35 percentage point reduction in poverty incidence among ex-combatants and moderate improvement in livelihoods. But this economic boost did not seem to have caused political reintegration: while they found a modest increase in propensities to report civilian life as preferable to combatant life, there was no evidence that the program contributed to either more satisfaction with the peace process or a more positive disposition toward current government institutions.

**Lamb, G.; Alusala, N.; Mthembu-Salter, G.; Gasana, J.. (2012). *Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War: Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo*. World Bank Group**

In 'Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War,' Lamb, Alusala, Mthembu-Salter, Gasana suggest that the livelihood choices of individual ex-combatants were directly informed by their personal circumstances, experiences, family responsibilities, skills and livelihoods and income generating experience. The accessibility of individual networks that could be utilized for economic purposes, such as accessing loans, business partners, investors and markets, was a key ingredient to securing sustainable livelihoods. A remarkable finding of the research was that many ex-combatants had entered into business arrangements with individuals and networks that did not have military backgrounds. Another positive finding was that in some cases, those ex-combatants from armed groups that were previously at war with each other, appeared to be able to work alongside each other relatively peacefully in a range of professions, including artisanal mining, motorcycle taxi driving, small business and fishing. There seemed to be a correlation between ex-combatants' livelihood choice and marital and family status. In many cases, if a male ex-combatant was married and had children, then the livelihood option was often stable and legitimate. A similar dynamic existed for female ex-combatants, particularly those who were unmarried and had to provide for their dependents. In the case of young male ex-combatants, riskier livelihood options were often pursued, such as artisanal mining, mineral smuggling, operating motorcycle taxis, and in some cases, criminal activities. The manner in which ex-combatants used the reinsertion and reintegration kits provided to them varied. Some used them directly for income generation activities. A significant number sold the kits, with some using the proceeds for short-term consumption, while others invested the funds in an economic venture which they determined as being more appropriate to their personal circumstances. It was interesting to note that virtually no reintegration support was provided for certain types of income generating activities that were popular among ex-combatants, such as artisanal mining and motorcycle taxis. Some ex-combatants often started working in menial jobs, accumulated savings and then invested in more profitable ventures. There was often a positive, upward spiral process. Given these positive dynamics, it may be possible to advocate that ex-combatants are increasingly becoming implicit agents of peace.

**Bob, C. (2005). *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism*. Syracuse University Press**

In 'The Marketing of Rebellion,' Clifford Bob focuses on the complexities involved in gaining international support, especially from NGOs, for social movements in the peripheral world. The author uses two case studies, which are on the Ogoni in Nigeria and the Zapatistas in Mexico, to establish his points. In these case studies, he also uses other movements in close proximity that were not successful in gaining support or fame to add a relevant comparison. Bob argues that both the Ogoni and the Zapatista's had to modify key attributes in their campaigns, less to gain help in the first place, than to maintain and expand it later. The same processes and parallel strategies occurred in the Nigerian and Mexican case. In the Zapatistas case, the author explains that their goals initially were to be a voice for all of Mexico's poor and unrepresented. These goals did not resonate domestically or internationally. It proved to be more attractive when they framed their revolt as indigenous and this form of identity politics made them much more popular. They very quickly gained sympathy from their domestic population and from international allies. This also occurred in the Ogoni case, in which they first attempted to gain aid for political reasons and failed, but then marketed their campaign as an environmental and human rights issue. This allowed them to gain popularity and NGO backing. The key factors that helped both the Ogoni and the Zapatistas were their training and knowledge in distant audiences preferences, media savvy, and strategic skills, which allowed them to exploit opportunities available in the global support market. A significant proportion of their success also lay in their leaders. The personal histories of their chief leaders and their dominant ideological influences played a role. Both movements' leaders were seen as charismatic, fluent in several key languages that NGOs operated in, and had writing skills that allowed them greater output and marketing for the domestic and international sphere. In addition, Ken Saro- wiwa's financial resources allowed him and other MOSOP leaders to engage in intensive overseas activity, while his pre-existing contacts and standing afforded the Ogoni entrée to environmental and human rights gatekeepers. The Zapatistas had none of these advantages. But through the strategic use of surprise, drama, and force that immediately shot them to prominence. The Ogoni's primary mechanism was personal lobbying of key and NGO staff in their home countries. In this way, MOSOP inches its way to international consciousness nonviolently and with limited though important aid

from the press. By contrast, the Zapatistas initially used a much more transgressive and less controlled spectacle aimed at attracting the media, which in turn let the whole world know of the rebellion within hours of their attacks. These distinct testing tacks stemmed from varying characteristics of the two movements.

**Nilsson, A. (2005). *Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies*. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Publications**

In 'Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-Conflict Societies,' Anders Nilsson discusses the need for an alternative definition of reintegration, which combines aspects of both the practical and theoretical definitions. Nilsson proposes the following definition: "Reintegration is seen as a societal process aiming at the economic, political, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society." Nilsson believes that at the time of writing, there were no theories that explained the conditions that lead to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. Therefore, fifteen recommendations were put forward to make reintegration efforts more effective. These are:

- 1) When should reintegration assistance be given? A: if they provide a security threat to peace, B: if the atrocities they committed create a conflict rift in society, C: many combatants cannot support themselves.
- 2) When should assistance not be given? If there is no peace agreement, if there is no political will among the ex-combatants to abide by the peace agreement and if there is a continued level of violence.
- 3) What forms should reintegration take? Donors finding a way to substitute the benefits and spoils of war with the spoils of peace and healing the damage left by war.
- 4) Find substitutes for the benefits of war. Ex-combatants' security must be ensured, they must have economic opportunities that are legal, must be able to have influence in decisions and finally make sure ex-combatants do not lose societal prestige.
- 5) Ensure the physical security of ex-combatants by reforming the national police and making sure there is democratic control over the armed forces.
- 6) Ensure the economic stability of ex-combatants. This can be done by educating them on the basic knowledge of market structures, apprenticeships and on the job training. They also need opportunities to use these skills.
- 7) Ensuring political influence of ex-combatants by encouraging ex-combatants to participate in politics.

- 8) Healing the wounds of war can be done by organizing healing ceremonies at the community level and that the community shares a focus of a common future.
- 9) Dangers of exclusively targeting ex-combatants. If the aid is only towards demobilized combatants, it can possibly create resentment from the local community. Instead, aid should be focused on broad development projects that include ex-combatants.
- 10) Ex-combatants are a heterogeneous group. They cannot be treated as a homogenous group: therefore, distinctions must be made to separate categories based on identity.
- 11) Reintegration into rural or urban environments. Since rural reintegration is more successful, any ex-combatants with rural roots should be incentivized to return.
- 12) Cost efficiency: co-coordination between the donors and local actors should be focused on a shared strategy of cost efficiency. This can be done by remembering reintegration is done in the local community without external effort.
- 13) Contextual factors making reintegration difficult. Donors need to be aware of what circumstances lead back to violence and to plan accordingly to sway ex-combatants to peace.

**Lederach, J. P. (1996). *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. Syracuse University Press**

In 'Preparing for Peace,' John Paul Lederach focuses on conflict transformation across cultures and provides both theoretical insight and practical advice. The author believes that the foundation for peacemaking is based on a value orientation that is in favor of less powerful groups attaining a voice; where education, advocacy, and mediation share the goal of change and restructuring unpeaceful relationships; and has a consistent vision and aim of justice. Much of the book focuses on describing the prescriptive and the elicitive model as approaches for training. The prescriptive model was described as when, 'primary control and design of the training lies with the trainer'. Lederach goes into detail about this method and gives examples, many citing this as a standard North American method in training. He then describes the elicitive method, in which the trainer is less of an 'expert' giving knowledge, and is rather a catalyst and facilitator. In this model, the process is participatory and is influenced by Freire, where the training participants are not 'empty vessels' to be filled with knowledge, but are rather knowledgeable and valuable 'primary resources' in the training process. This method allows participants to actively share about their experiences and local knowledge during

training. A highly interesting aspect of Lederach's ideas was the merging of the prescriptive and elicitive model in training for a more thorough experience.